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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUSTIN RICE, 
vs. 
Pla.intiff a.nd 
A pvp-ellarnt, 
ERMA RICE, Executrix and Trustee, In 
the matter of the Esitate of David L. 
Rice, Deceased, 
De f endwnt and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
'7268 
REP·LY BRIEF O·F PLAINTIF·F AND: APPEL~LAN·T 
Defendant's hrief discloses anew the reasons for this 
needless and unduly protracted litigation. She misstates 
the will. She misstates our position. :Sh·e cites cases 
and legal principles that are not involved and never have 
been involved in this litigation, except as they have arisen 
by the success of opposing counsel in inducing the lower 
court to commit ·error. She attempts to avoid the real 
issues involved, and to lay the resulting confusion on 
our doorstep. 
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The plaintiff's position from the filing of the first 
petition, (R. 6'5), until the present moment has been 
clear and easy to unders1tand. It has not changed at 
alt It is succinctly stated in fu,e quotation given by us 
In our former brief, pages 78 and 79, as follows: 
''The genera~ rule is that the failure to per-
form the duty to make disclosures which rests 
upon one because of a trust or confidential rela-
tion constitutes fraud sufficient for a court of 
equity :to relieve against the judgment. This 
conclusion could be based upon one of two 
theories, nam·ely, that the fraud involved is of 
an extrinsic nature, or that the fact that the guilty 
party is a fiduciary makes an exception to the 
· rule requiring the fraud to be extrinsic. J\1ost 
courts simply declare the rule without discussing 
the kind of fraud involved.'' 31 Am. Jur. Sec. 
67 4, page 241. 
From the beginning defendant has assum·ed that 
David Rice devised to his son Austin ~27 acres of land, 
and that it was her prerogative to determine which 27 
acres Aus'tin should r·eceive. 'She has, also, assumed 
that she could depriv-e Austin of any water because the 
will made no mention of water in connection with the 
land devised. 
At the very beginning of her brief, in the second 
sentence, appears the erroneous and indefensible posi-
tion assumed by the executrix throughout 1this matter. 
That sentence says : ''By said decree, A us tin Rice, a p-
pellant, was awarded as his full distributiv~e share of his 
father's estate 'approximately 27 acres in ·Section 31, 
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Township 3 North, Range 1 East, 'Salt Lake Meridian, 
no'v occupied by him'.'' Tha1t statement of the defend-
ant discloses again her de~iherate intention to misread 
the will. The will did not make a devis-e to Austin Rice 
in the language quoted hy the defendant in her brief. 
The will said: (R. 13) "I give and bequeath to my son 
Austin Rice the land, ap·p.roximately 27 acres in S·ection 
31, Township 3 N·orth, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
now occupied by him.'' The will grammatically arranged 
says: ''I give and bequeath to my son Austin Rice 
the land now occupied by him, ap·proximately 27 acres 
in Section 31, Township· 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian.'' The wi1l did not say: ''I gi¥e and 
bequeath Austin Rice approximately 27 acres, now oc-
cupied by him.'' The will said: ''I give and bequeath to 
my son Austin Rice the Zand now occupied by him.'' IThe 
positive unequivocal language in 1the will is that Austin 
was to hav;e the land now occupied by him. The words 
"appiroximately 27 acres" are by. their own terms a 
mere approximation, and expressly indicate that the 
testator did not know exactly how much land Austin 
occupied. 
In the previous appeal of this case we discussed tthjs 
question (P. 24, 25 Reply Brief) and called this court's 
attention to the well known rules of construction; that 
the certain prevails over the uncertain; thwt definite 
language prevails over indefinite language, and that 
if Austin Rice occupied the land upon which his barn 
and corral are located, it was improper for the defendant 
to attem}lrt to deprive him of this land, and it was im-
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proper for her to leave it out of her petition for distribu-
tion. While this court did not ·expressly single out this 
particular phase of the l~tigation for comment and elu-
cidation, this court did by reversing the case sustain our 
position upon this point. It was not the prerogative of 
the defendant to say that her fa;ther gave Austin Rice 
27 acres of land and that she could select the 27 acres 
which in her judgment he should receive. And when, 
in her p·etition for distribution, she told the court that 
the land ·described therein was that which Austin had 
been devis·ed by the will, she told the court that which 
was not true, if in fact Austin occupied the land upon 
which the barn and corral are located. By her opening 
statement in her brief she again makes clear by the mis-
quotation of 1the will that her acts were deliberate and 
intentional, and that she intended to deprive Austin 
of the land occupied by him because there is no conflict 
whatever in the record that he occupied the barn and the 
corra~ p·roperty. In her p~tition for distribution she 
didn't e¥en select 27 acres. She selected what she al-
leged was ·27 acres, and the fact that it does not amount 
to 27 acres she ignores and has ignored throughout this 
caS'e. The land awarded to Austin by the decree of dis-
'trihution, as we have pointed out heretofore in our for-
mer brief, is 25 plus acres. Defendant certainly didn't 
advise the court that Austin occupied the barn and the 
corral property, and from her own lips we know that she 
intended to deprive him of this land whether he occupied 
it or not. In none of her briefs does she make any pre-
'tense of disputing that Austin occupied the barn and 
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the corral ~property. The testimony on that point IS 
over,vhehning and 'vithout dispute. 
On page 2 of her brief the defendant misstates the 
plaintiff's position in her subdivisions (a), (b) and (c). 
Instead of repeating defendant's statement of our p-osi-
tion may we again call attention as we have done here~ 
tofore on numerous occasions throughout our briefs to 
the facts as they ,exist in this record. We have always 
from the beginning taken the position that an executrix 
occupies a fiduciary relationship to the heirs. We have 
taken the further p-osition that the executrix is an of-
ficer of the court, and by virtue of her position and 
especial1y in this dual capacity as a fiduciary and as an 
officer of the eourt both the heirs and the court have the 
right to rely upon her implicitely and without question. 
Neither the heirs nor the court were under any obliga-
tion or duty \to question her actions. We have taken 
the position from the beginning that David L. Rice de-
vised to his son, Austin, the farm Austin occupied; that 
all appurtenant water was devised with the farm, and 
thrut Austin was entitled to such an award from the 
court in the decree of distribution. In our first peti-
tion, (R. 65), we called the court's attention to the fact 
that the pe1tition f-or distribution was not true; that land 
occupied by Austin had been omitted from the petition; 
that the executrix was attemp~ting by her actions to de-
prive the plaintiff even of water appurtenant to the de-
creed land, and we asked the court which still had juris-
diction of the executrix since the estate was not closed 
and also had jurisdiction of the executrix as a testa-
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mentary trustee 1to correct the errors in the decree of 
distrrbution which had occurr·ed by the intentional con-
duct of the executrix. 'The court erroneous~y sustained 
the demurrer to this petition, although i't stated a cause 
of action under all the authorities which we cited in our 
brief in this app·eal and which we will not now repeat. 
In an attempt to meet what we guess·ed was the -court's 
objection to the petition we alleged additional matters 
which we believed could be established. We filed an 
amended p·etition, but we never abandoned our first 
theory. We res'tated it and have maintained it con-
sistently and constantly from the beginning of this 
case to the pr·esent moment. We have ahvays taken 
the position 1that the defendant in her capacity as an 
executrix was a trustee; that the pro.perty in her hands 
was trust property; that the beneficiaries of the trust are 
the heirs and beneficiaries of the estate, ( P. 8 of our 
brief in case No. 7029 in this court). We took the posi-
tion 1th·en, and we do now that she was sti~l under the 
jurisdiction of the court, and that because of her fidu-
ciary capacity the court could correct any errors com-
mitted hy her in the administration of her trust which 
adversely affected the heirs and deprived them of the 
rights she was bound to :protect, (P. 9 of the aforesaid 
brief). We took the position then, and we take the 
position no_w that because of her fiduciary relationship 
any fraud committed by her whe1ther intentional pr 
unintentional, whether it be -called intrinsic or extrinsic, 
could be corrected, and that. the right to correct it was 
not dependent up·on any diligence exercis·ed 1by the heirs 
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7 
who had a right to rely upon her. We cited to this 
court in our first brief the case of Hazel-Atlas Glass 
Company vs. H.artford-Empli.re Cornp1any, 322 U.S. 238, 
88 L. Ed. 1250, 'vherein the court had under considera-
tion a judgment procured by fraud many years earlier, 
and \vhich apparently did not even involve ~the vita~ fidu-
ciary question involved in this case. In that case the 
court pointed out that equitable relief from a fraudulent 
judgment is not a statutory creation, and is no1t eon-
trolled by statutes, nor by the laches of the defrauded 
party, (although in the present case there is no question 
of laches), hut is a judicially devised remedy to free 
the court from the fraud practiced upon it. The fact 
that the judgment in that case had become final and 
not appealable was not controlling. The court said: 
''But even if Hazel did not exercis·e the high-
est degree of diligence Hartford's fraud cannot 
be condoned for that reason alone. This matter 
does not concern only private parties. * * * Fur-
thermore, tamp·ering with the administration of 
justice in the manner indisputab1y shown here 
involves far more than an injury to a single liti-
gant. It is a wrong against the institutions set 
up to protect and safeguard the public, insltitu-
tions in which fraud cannot complacently he tol-
erated consistently with the good order of society. 
Surely it carunot be that lpvreser·vation of the in-
'tieg.rity of the judicial P'~ocess mJUst alw~ays wait 
upon the dinigence of li.tig1ants. The public wel-
fare dem.and.s that the agencies ·of public justice 
be not so impotent that they must alw1ays be mute 
and helpless victims of d.e:cept~on and ftiwud. '' 
(page 246 U.S. Reports, 1256 of L_. Ed.) (Italics 
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added) (P. 13 and 14 of our brief In case No. 
7029 in this cour1t). 
We amended our petition in an attempt to satisfy 
the tria~ court, hut we never abandoned the original 
theory upon which this case was brought. We have al-
ways taken the position that water appurtenant to the 
land that was actually decreed went with it even though 
not mentioned in the decree of distribution, and this 
without consideration of the question of fraud. Inas-
much as it was necessary to raise this question because 
of the barn and corral properit~ not included in the de-
cree of distribution we pointed out then as we do now 
that" the same intentions that actuated the executrix with 
reference to the wa1ter, actuated her with reference to 
the omitted land, and since we asked the court to amend 
the decree to include the omitted land, we also asked the 
court to make the decree certain with reference to 1the 
water right-not because the water had not already 
passed, but because the ,executrix was disputing our 
right to it, and justifying her aC!tions hy the argument 
that it wasn't sp1ecifically mentioned in the decree of 
distribution. 'To set this argument and controversy at 
rest we asked the court to amend the decree of distri1bu-
tion. The court still had the entire matter before it. 
There was no question then, and there is no question 
now of any rights of innocent third parties. ·Ther~e is 
no question of depriving any one of anything to which 
he is ·entitled, but we merely asked that the plaintiff be 
given what his father devised to him, and that the er-
roneous decree of distribution which awarded his prop-
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erty to the other heirs be corrected. The defendant and 
the other heirs ,,~ere not entit'led to plaintiff's water 
and 'vere not entitled to plaintiff's land, and the de-
termined effort of the defendant from the beginning up 
to the present time to secure for herself land and water 
to which the plaintiff is entitled when it was her duty 
to see he got it, is fraud no matter whaJt argument she 
makes as to her good intentions. She is still trying to 
get the plaintiff's "\Vater and the plaintiff's land. She 
was not an adversary party in any of these p·roceedings 
prior to the decree of distribution. She was a fiduciary. 
She was the rep,resentative of the plaintiff. H·er coun-
sel was his counsel, and when, in her petition for distri-
bution she by her counsel stated to the court that she 
was describing al~ that plaintiff was enti~tled to under 
the will, she made thos,e assertions as the rep.resenta-
tive of the plaintiff. When the court acted upon those 
representations, if they were untrue, 1the court was de-
ceived, and the plaintiff's fraud was extrinsic under all 
the authorities. 
Assume that the defendant had said to the plain-
tiff: ''Your father didn 'it ~eave you anything under the 
will,'' and the plaintiff had relied upon her assertion 
and gone his way, and later after the decree of distribu-
tion had become final had discovered that there was a 
devise to him. Under defendant's theory she could say: 
''You had no right 1to rely on me, and you are out, and 
I am in. I get what shou'ld have gone to you, and you 
are powerless to make me give it up." Fortunately, 
that is not the law. When the defendant accepted the 
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10 
appointment as an executrix, she 1then became charged 
with the duty of :properly repres·enting the plaintiff, and 
he had the right to rely upon her. 'Suppose the defend-
ant had said to the plain tiff as she claims she did, al-
though the coul'!t has found to the contrary: ''Your 
father did not leave you any water and did not leave 
you the land across the street,'' and the plaintiff believ-
ing her had gone his way. The fact that the decree of 
distribution had become final would not prevent the 
court from correcting the wrong done by the defendant 
in her fiduciary capacity. ·The cases are uniform on 
this subject, as we have already pointed out. Later we 
sha~l also point out how this court is committed to the 
same doctrine. Defendant assumes that because the 
trial court found that she did not prevent hiin from 
attending the hearing on 1the petition for distribution 
that is decisive of this case. It is nothing of the kind. 
That is only a minor ·element in this case. The trial 
court found, as, of ·course, he must since it is in the 
record and can't 'he disputed, that the defendant in her 
petition for distribution stated to the court, paragraph 
6 of the findings of fact herein: 
"That in paragraph 6 of her petition for t:fle 
settlement of her final account and for distribu-
tion, said Erma Rice, executrix among other 
things set forth : 
'6. That by said last will and testamen't said 
decedent devised : · 
' (a) * ·* * * 
'(b) Unto his son, Austin Rice, as his full 
and only distributive share -of said decedent's 
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estate the following· described property located 
in Farmington, Davis County, State of Utah, to-
'vit :' " (D·escribing the decreed land without 
the barn and corral property and without men-
tion of water appurtenant to the decreed land). 
In other words, in this case the trial court sp,ecifically 
found thaJt this defendant told the court in the probate 
proceedings that that land and only that land without 
water was what David Rice devised to his son, Austin. 
Later in the findings the court said and found, finding 
No. 9, that there " ... as four hours of water appurtenant 
to the land. In her testimony, as we pointed out in our 
brief in this appeal, the defendant stated that there. was 
no water at all appurtenant to the land; that she in-
tended to deprive the plaintiff of the water. She sti~l 
insists in her brief herein that there is no water ap-
purtenant. She still intends 1to deprive him of tfie 
water, and yet the trial court in finding No. 11 states : 
''That the failure of the ·executrix to include 
any water rights from Davis Creek as appurten-
ant to the said 27.71 acres or to have any water 
right decreed as appurtenant to said ~and was 
not for the purpose or with any intent of attemp't-
ing to deceive the court or to defraud the peti-
tioner.'" 
This finding is directly contrary to finding No. '6, and 
is directly contrary to th·e defendant's own !testimony 
at the trial, and to her assertions in h·er brief here. 
There isn't a shadow of a doubt that she intentionally 
failed to mention the waJter and the barn and corral 
/ prop,erty; that she int~entionally intended to deprive the 
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plaintiff of it, and that she still intends to if she can. 
In finding of fact No. 6 'the court found that the defend-
ant petitioned the court as therein s-et forth. She did not 
cal'l to the court's attention in the p~robate matter the fact 
that the will gave to Austin Rice the land he then oC-
cupied. On the contrary, she herself, said thrut she as-
sumed to tell the court that the land she described was 
all that Austin was entitled to without any reference to 
the ques~tion of whether or not he occupied it or whether 
he occupied other or additional lands. If she did as she 
says she did and told Austin that he was getting all that 
his father left him, then she to~d him that which was not 
true. She, hers·elf, is the witness who said she did this 
intentionally and for the purpose of keeping him from 
obtaining anything -else. 
In this case there is just no question that the de-
fendant intended to keep Austin from getting any water 
with his land, and that she intended to keep him from 
getting the barn and the corral property. And if she 
told him, as she said she did, that that is what his father 
left him under the will and nothing more, and he relied 
upon her, that is fraud, eall it intrinsic or extrinsic or 
what you may, that will he set aside and corrected, and 
~particular1y where the matter is still pending in the 
court where the deception occurred. 
Defendant asserts at page 3 of her brief that the 
trial court found that the defendant was not guilty of any 
fraudulent misrepresentation of any kind, intrinsic or 
extrinsic. It makes no difference what the defendant 
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asserts or "~hat statements are made in the findings 
w·hen it appears 'Yithout contradiction in the record that 
the defendant represented to the court in her petition 
for distribution that the land therein ·described without 
water was all that Austin was devised under the will. 
The lower court here expressly finds that ther·e were 
four hours of water appurtenant to the decreed land. 
The defendant herself stated that she intended to deprive 
Austin of that water, and her brief still insists at page 
32 that he is not entitled to it. Having found that there 
is water appurtenant to the land, and having found 
that the defendant represented to the court that the 
land had no water, it is idle to ass·ert that a finding of 
no fraud can be sustained. 
It is true that the trial court found that the defend-
ant did not prevent the plaintiff from attending the 
hearing on the pe:tition for distribution hecaus·e p~laintiff 
becam·e confused as to the time when this hearing was 
held and said it was in the spring instead or in De-
cember. Defendant asserts that there is no proof in the 
record to sustain this allegation in the plaintiff's 
amended p·eltition. The plaintiff was very clear as to 
the event, but not clear as to the time when it occurred. 
Be that as it may, and assuming, as we must, that the 
trial court's finding on this point is sustained by Erma 
Rice's denial, she, here self, t;estified that she told the 
plaintiff that under the will he got no water, and he 
didn't get the barn and the corrai property. 'The plain-
tiff was required to go no further. He was ·entitled to 
rely upon her. It now develops from the uncontradiclt:ed 
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evidence that he did occupy at all times the barn and the 
corral :property, and that that land is in Section 31. 
The barn and the corral isn't worth anything to any-
body else, bu:t to the plaintiff it is an indispensable part 
of his farm and always has been, and his father knew 
this when the will was drawn. There is not a word in 
the will to support defendant's assertion erroneously 
admitted by the trial} court that the father said Austin 
was to ge:t the land below the road. It is also undisputed 
in the record that for several years prior to his death 
the father didn't use the harn or corral property at all. 
So it is US'eless for defendant to ass·ert, whether the trial 
court found i:t or not, that she did not make misrepre-
sentations both to the plaintiff upon which he relied and 
also to the court in the pro bate rna tter. 
The trial court having found that there was ap-
purtenant water, has found directly against e~ery one 
of the defendant's witnesses who testified that there was 
no water from Davis Creek used on the Austin Rice 
tract. Having found that there was appurtenant water, 
of course, ~the appurtenant water passed under the de-
cree of distribution, and it was perfectly proper for the 
trial court to define the extent of that water right. It 
was improper, however, for the trial eourt to mix .that 
issue up with other water rights of David L. Rice and 
to try to apportion David L. Rice's 32 hours of water 
among a~l of his farms. 'That was not an issue. The 
only issue in this case on that point was what wa;ter was 
appurtenant to the Austin Rice farm. The defendant 
and most of her witnesses said there was none, in spite 
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of the fact that some of defendant's "\vitnesses testi-
fied that Austin did use the high water. No attemtprt 
was made by defendant or her witnesses to show what 
part of David L. Rice's 32 hours had been most recently 
used on any ;tract. It cannot be determined from this 
record what 'vater David Rice used on any other land just 
prior to the making of his 'vill or prior to his death, -and 
that is the time at 'vhich 've must make the determination 
in order to know w·hat "\Vater was appurtenant to any par-
ticular land. The court did not believe the def,endant or 
her witnesses. Th·e court did believe the. plaintiff and 
his witnesses that there was some appurtenant water, 
and so found. We submit the court cou'ld have done 
nothing else. From David L. Rice himself comes the 
most significant bit of evidence in the entire case. In 
his application to the State Engineer for the well and 
drain on the southeast corner of the Austin Rice :tract 
he stated in 1936, as we have pointed out heretofore, that 
the wel~ and the drain was merely to supplem·ent his 
canyon water. That was before Austin Rice went on 
the farm. David L. Rice hadn't abandoned his canyon 
water. He was claiming it as late as 1'93'6. In fact, as 
the trial court himself significantly remarked at one 
point in the case when sustaining defendant's objection 
to the conversation between David L. Rice and others 
with reference to eem~enting the ditch the entire way: 
that, the ditc:P. itself is there~ There is no dispute that 
the ditch itself runs to the Austin Rice tract, and in this 
country we don't dig ditches to carry non-existent water. 
Having found that there was appurtenant water, the 
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trial .court was wrong in saying that Erma Rice did not 
make any misrepresentations, and having found that 
there was appurtenant wa:ter, the trial court was bound 
to decr~ee to Austin Rice's farm sufficient water to be of 
some good. The very meaning of appurtenant water is 
water us·ed on the land to which it is ap:prurtenant and 
which is essential to the land in order for it to be pro-
ductive. 
Austin and his wife testified that they hav.e used the 
water from Davis Creek for ten hours a week every 
week since they were on the farm. That the water from 
Davis Creek has been used on the Austin Rice farm 
during the entire irrigation s-eason is borne out by every 
one of the plaintiff's witnesses. And as to the use dur-
ing the recent years, McQuiston, both of the Hughes 
men and Austin and his wife state that it was suf-
ficient to mature crops on ;th.e 8 to 1'2 acres. Without 
the water these acres are useless, and Austin's inheri-
tance is of little vaflue. It is preposterous to believe that 
in this country a father would will his son a farm with-
out any waJter, particularly when the land was acquired 
with appurtenant water, was inventoried with appurten-
ant water, and the appurtenant water was still claimed 
by the father as late as 1936 in an official document 
recorded in the S;tate Engineer's Office. As to the 
amount of water, no one disputes Austin and his wife 
that the ten hours are essential and necessary, not only 
for the 8 to 12 acres of high ground, but also when avail-
ab~e for the hay. Appurtenant water is water tha;t has 
been used on land and is necessary for that land, and 
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there is not one \Yord in the record to dispute the testi-
mony that the ten hours and the entire ten hours are 
needed. 
Defendant in her brief criticizes our statement of 
the evidence, but fails to point out anything specific. 
H·er own analysis emphasizes mainly that each one of 
her witnesses stated that the Austin Rice farm is irri-
gated by drains. The trial court exp·ressly struck this 
out of the findings. 'This appears from our ohjection to 
the proposed findings, as we have pointed out in our 
former brief. The court refused to find that the Aus:tin 
Rice tract was irrigated by drains in th·e absurd man-
ner testified to by defendant and her witnesses. On 
page 7 of her brief defendant herself points out that her 
witness, Roy White, contradicts all of her brothers who 
testified that never was any water used from Davis 
Creek through the White Ditch on the Austin Rice farm. 
Roy White said that David L. Rice· took water through 
the ditch up to 1919. So we may ignor~e, as the trial 
court did, every ·witness who stated that no water was 
used from the Davis ·Creek on the Austin Rice tract, and 
we may ignore, as the trial court did, every witness who 
said Austin's farm was watered by drains. 
On page 8 of her brief defendant says that Mrs. 
Austin Rice could only testify as to a period subsequent 
to 1937. Whoever wrote this assertion doesn't know 
what the record shows. Annie Rice testified that she 
had been familiar with this land al~ her life, and par-
ticularly familiar with i;t ever since her marriage in 
1930 or thereabouts. Defendant also makes the asser-
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tion on page 8 of her brief that it is impossible to believe 
Mrs. Annie Rice because she stated that she helped her 
husband irrigate and also attended to rearing of her 
children during those years. This s1tatement is utterly 
inexcusable, and is a purely gratuitous assertion, and 
since the defendant has indulged in the gratuity, may "\ve 
state to the court that we have s-een the defendant's wife 
assisting in the irrigation and have seen her caring for 
her children herse'lf and without any assistance ·except 
as the children themselves gav·e it to her. · ·The plain-
tiff's wif·e has the true pioneer instincte ·of assisting her 
husband regardless of his poverty, and in spite of the 
fact ;that she has other duties which would overwhehn 
an ordinary woman. This slur on plaintiff's wife by 
defendant who must know, if she knows anything, of the 
hardships and trials that that family has undergone and 
of their courageous and single-handed battle is utterly 
malevolent. 
Again on page 8 of h·er 'brief defendant incorrectly 
summarizes the testimony of Irvin Hughes to the effect 
that he said he had never seen wat~er diverted from the 
White Ditch on the Austin Rice ~and. At pages ·26 and 
27 of our former brief we gave the correct statement of 
Irvin Hughes' testimony. Irvin Hughes stated that he 
had seien Austin use the water on his land during the 
last few years since he has been living on the property, 
and that he used it all summer and also for early crops; 
that he used. the water after it was on shares; that 
about thre.e years ago Austin got scared by a rattlesnake 
when going up the ditch; that that was in July after 
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the 'vater had gone on shares. In fact, he said Austin 
had flooded their land out at one tin1e by letting the ditch 
get clogged; that was about five years ago. He also 
said that there was no other place for David L. Rice to 
get 'vater except from the Davis Creek through the 
\Vhite Ditch. The same criticism applies to defendant's 
analysis of David R. Lund's testimony which we re-
cited at pages 27 and 28 of our former bri~ef. D;efend-
ant criticizes p~aintiff's witness, McQuiston. She well 
could be apprehensive of his testimony, but her attempt 
to minimize its importance is futile. His testimony as 
we have detailed it at pages 29 and 30 of our brief 
positively, clearly and without contradiction establishes 
not only that Austin used the water during the irriga-
tion season, but that his turn was at night, as Austin has 
testified. 
The trial court should have found that the ten hours 
of water were appurtenant to the land because the ten 
hours of water have been used and are necessary. Ap-
purtenant water, our statute declares, as we have called 
to the attention of this court in our former brief at page 
54, :Sec. 100-1-11, U.C.A. 1943, passes with ;the p~arcel of 
land on which the right was exercised next preeeding the 
time of the execution of any conveyance thereof. There 
is nobody who disputes Austin and his wife as to the 
ten hours of water being used ''next preceding the time 
of the execution of any conveyance ;thereof,'' except de-
fendant and her witnesses whom the court refus·ed to 
believe. Defendant asks why wou~d David Rive use one-
third of his water to irrigate 8 or 9 acres through a ditch 
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that won't hold water until it was cemented in 1934, when 
he had upwards of 70 acres· of orchard and other lands. 
The answer to this query is simple. In the first place, 
there ar.e more than 8 acres needing irrigation. During 
the freshet season the en tire tract is irrigated with all 
the water it can get, and during the irrigation season 
as long as the water lasts in sufficient quantity the ten 
hours is us~ed on all ithe farm, and it is only when it 
dwindles that the ten hours are a;pplied exclusively to 
the high [and which is described variously as from 8 to 
12 acres. In the s·econd place, none of the early irriga-
tion ditches in this state carried water efficiently and 
none of the ditches in this strut:e were impervious. It has 
been a constant battle to get irrigation ditches made 
impervious so that they would carry water. The query 
is: why did they cement the White D1tch at all and put 
a culvert under the road to carry it to the Austin Rice 
farm if it was never used for the Austin Rice farm, and 
why was David Rice trying to ~et it cemented clear to 
his place if he had abandoned :the water, and why in 
1936 did he assert to the State Engineer that he wanted 
a well to supplement his canyon water if he had no 
canyon water. In the third place, there isn't any evi-
dence at all in this record that David L. Rice used jus1t 
prior to his death any of his water on his orchards, or 
where he used it. 'That question was not an issue in this 
case. Austin Rice in support of his motion for new trial 
makes affidavit of facts that wou~d have been produced 
had i:t been an issue as to what other farms of David L. 
Rice used water. We were concerned only with what 
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water "~as appurtenant to the Austin Rice farm, and 
the record is undisputed that if there is an ap1purtenant 
water right, 'vhich the court found there was, that ap-
purtenant \Yater right is ten hours. 
Defendant brushes off the barn and corral property 
with a paragraph "\Vhich says nothing. There was no 
dispute in the evidence as to this land, and when the 
trial count found that .... c\ustin didn't occupy the land, 
he found in the face of the uncontradicted evidence. We 
pointed out in our former brief the value of th!e various 
bequests and devises under the David L. Rice will. We 
did this in order for this court to see how little value 
there would be to the Aus:tin Rice inheritance under de-
fendant's theory, and also to point out to this court how 
little justification there is for defendant trying to de-
prive him of the ham and corral proper;ty when its 
value is so insignificant to anyone hut him. Defendant 
asks why she woUld have any motiv;e in doing what she 
has done. The reason is clear to us that becaus~e 2.7 
acres were mentioned in the will, she and her counsel 
decided that they would select the 27 acres, which in 
reality are only 25 acres, that Aus:tin should get and 
would leave out his barn and corral, and that because 
the will didn't mention any water they would take that 
away from him too. In her petition for distribution 
defendant described every <tract as having a'ppurtenant 
water where the inventory showed it had appurtenant 
water ~except the Austin Rice tract. Why did she leave 
him out~ We submit she left him out because she 
thought tha;t because the wi~l didn't say water she could 
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deprive him of any water, and she has stub1hornly and 
p~ersistently, and still does in her present hrief, tried to 
sustain her position. If that doesn't constitute mis-
representation and fraud, we confess we do not know 
what does. 
THE QUES:TION ~OF E·XTRIN'STC FRAUD 
We have already discussed in our former brief and 
her·etofore in this reply the doctrine that the misrepre-
sentations of one acting in a fiduciary capacity are ex-
trinsic fraud, although, as pointed out by the authorities, 
most of the eourts do not trouble to attempt to label the 
fraud, and some of them in discussing the question state 
that if the fraud of the fiduciary could be characterized 
as intrinsic, the effect of it will be overcome as an ex-
ception to the extrinsic fraud rule. However, in view 
of the fact :that defendant has devoted most of her brief 
to a discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud (pages 
10 to 25 inclusive) and asserts that it is immaterial in 
this ease whether there was appurtenant water to the 
Austin Rice 1tract or whether or not Austin occupied the 
barn and the corral property and that whether Erma 
Rice was under any duty to ca'll these facts to the court's 
attention ''is all beside the real question for determina-
tion on :this appeal,'' page 10. Additional comment 
seems in order. In other words, since the defendant and 
her counse1 now baldly state that it is immaterial to the 
real question in this cas·e whether or not she was guilty 
of fraud, we will hriefly notice her argument. 
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As we understand her contention, it is now the same 
as it was at the hearing on the first demurrer to the first 
petition of the plaintiff. Stated in our language, it is 
this, that because she 'vaited until the decree of distribu-
tion had beco1ne fina1 before she raised any of these ques-
tions against Austin, he cannot now correct th·e wrong 
done him. The record is quite clear that Erma never 
attempted to interfere with Austin's use of the barn 
and corral property or the water until after the decree 
of distribution became final, and she thought it was 
too late for Austin to do anything a:hout it. There is 
no question whatever that until this present hearing 
Austin's rights 'vere never presented to any court. No 
court determined what water he was en1titled to nor 
whether or not he was entitled to the barn and corral 
property. Those qu·estions w·ere never p~resented. Why~ 
Because Erma Rice never called them to the court's at-
tention. She intended then and intends now to deprive 
Austin of both the water and the land. Never has he had 
his day in court until now, and that was solely because of 
the conduct of the def·endant. He claims it was because 
she never disclosed her true intentions but had a~ways 
told him ~that she would s·ee that he got all that he· was 
entitled to under his father's will. She claims that she 
told him that under the will he didn't get any water 
or the barn and corral property. Under either state of 
facts ~there is ·extrinsic fraud under all the authorities. 
Defendant assumes that because the trial court found 
that she did not do anything to prevent Austin from 
attending the hearing on the petition for dis1tribution 
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that Austin has no -cause of action. It was never our 
theory that we were entitled to relief only upon the 
narrow ground that she :told him he didn't need to re-
main at the hearing of the petition for distribution. He 
says she did do that, and she says she didn't. 'The trial 
court did not sustain Austin's position on this point, but 
the defendant can't deny that the petition for distribu-
tion was false, and she intended it to he false, and if, as 
she says she told Austin he didn't get the water or the 
barn and corral property under the will, that was false, 
and it was. extrinsic fraud if he relied upon her as he 
had a right to do and as a result of her conduct and his 
reliance he loses to her gain. 
Counsel says at page 13 of def·endant's bri·ef that 
the only al1legation of extrinsic fraud is that ~the defend-
ant by her ·conduct induced Austin not to remain f.or 
the hearing on the petition for distribution. That is 
a most inconsequential part of Austin's case. Even if 
he had remained, he wouldn't have known any more than 
he did by going away. He wouldn't have lmown without 
an independent examination of the eounty records 
whether the property described therein contained the 
barn and the -corral or not. Nor would he have known 
that Erma was contending that appurtenant water did 
not accompany the land to be decreed. The crux of this 
case is that the will gave Austin the land he now oc-
cupies, and that devise carries with it appurtenant water, 
and if by her conduct she has p·revented him from s-ecur-
ing the land he ·occupied with the appurtenant water, 
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that is extrinsic fraud no matter how she accom1plished 
it. Counsel argues that because Austin says the ~event 
took place at the courthouse in the spring- time instead of 
in December the defendant can go scot free. The tim~e 
or the place or the occasion is not the test of extrinsic 
fraud, but it is the thing done and relied upon regard~~ess 
of when or where it was done that constitutes the fraud. 
Counsel cite, as \\"'"e have heretofore cited, the ca:s·e 
of W eya1zt vs. Utah Sa.vifn.gs and Trust Company, 54 Utah 
181, 182 Pac. 189. That case as we read it is in line with 
all the authorities that the fraud of the administratrix 
if it occurs during the administration is extrinsic fraud. 
Our court in that case points out at page 206 of the 
Utah Reports: 
''In this case, however, the administratrix, 
so far as respondents are concerned, acted direct-
ly contrary to and in the very teeth of the duty 
imposed upon her by law * * *." "* * * nor did 
the W;rongs commlitted by her occur after the 
decree of ·distribution, nor when acting in the 
capacity lot her t'ha.n that of administratrix.'' 
(Italics added) 
In that case there was extrinsic fraud because the ad-
ministratrix committed her wrongs while in her capacity 
as administratrix. It is true that ther·e was actually no 
notice to the true heirs of the proceedings, hut that was 
not the controlling principle involved in the case. The 
principle in the case is the same as that announced by 
all the authorities ·except one referred to by defendant 
to which we shall hereafter caU attention. That prin-
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ciple is the one we have repeatedly reiterated, that the 
fraud of an administratrix committed in the- consumma-
tion of her trust is extrinsic. All of the actionable fraud 
of the administratrix in the- Weyant cas·e was committed 
by her whil~ she was admi:r:tistratrix, and despite the 
fact that the decree of distribution had long since become 
final, our court at page 202 of the Utah Reports says: 
"We are :presented with a case, therefore, 
where the fraud is not only extrinsic, but where 
it operated directly upon the -court as well as· upon 
the respondents; that is the adminis'tratrix merely 
used the court as an instrumentality by means 
of which· she gained her end, nam·ely, to acquire 
the property belonging to respondents through 
legal forms.'' 
Language could not mor·e aptly describe the exact situa-
tion with which we are confronted in the present cast. 
·Counsel cites in defendant's brief the case of D1avis 
vs. Se:avy, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 35 and quotes from it at 
length. That case is exactly ·contrary to the W·eyant 
case, and the decision in the Davis vs. Seavy case is con-
trary to all other jurisdictions we have discovered in-
c1uding Utah and the California cas-es cited by defend-
ant. 'The Washington case puts a premium upon dis-
honesty and in effect advises trustees that if they can 
successfully conceal their fraud until they have reaped 
the fruits of it, the courts will p-rotect them. 1Such is 
not and never has heen the law. In the Weyant case the 
administratrix did not disclose to the court the existence 
of relevant facts, and by r·eason of her failure to make 
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these disclosures she secured property that should have 
gone to the other heirs. She did· exactly the same thing 
as did the executrix in the present cas·e and in the Wash-
ingt.on case. Our court said that that was extrinsic 
fraud even though it involved false and perjured testi-
mony in the proceeding itself. In the Weyant case our 
court cites with approval the case of Benson vs. Ander-
son, 10 Utah 135 heretofore re'lied upon by us and also 
the ·California case of Sohle.r vs. Bohler, ·67 Pac. 282, 
likewise heretofore relied upon by us. In the Weyant 
case the administratrix's acts,. as the court points out, 
occurred during the course of the administration and· 
·while she was acting as administratrix, and they, there-
fore, constitute extrinsic fraud because they p·r~evented 
the heirs from receiving what she was in duty hound 
to see that they did receive. Her conduct prevented the 
heirs from receiving what they were entitled to, and 
that was ·extrinsic fraud, even though it involved false 
and perjured testimony in the hearing itself. In prin-
ciple the Weyant case and the present case are identical. 
Counsel state at page 23 that the case of Earl vs. 
Picken, 113 Fed. ( 2) 150, cited in our brief pages 85-87, 
is not the rule in this state. The principles in the case 
of Earl vs. Picken are not oniy the rule in this state, 
but in every other state with the possible exception of 
the one Washington case supra. We will not repeat 
what we have heretofore said in our former brief in this 
connection. ·Counsel cite two Utah cases, Ande:rson vs. 
State, 65 Utah 512, and W~ight vs. Oonst·ruct~ovn Com-
pany, 108 Utah 28. In neither case was there any fidu-
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c1ary relationship involved. Both cases involved ad-
versary proceedings. The probate p·roceedings in the 
instant case were in no s·ense adversary. In the probate 
proceedings both the defendant and her counsel were 
our representatives. As a matter of true logic, neither 
defendant nor her counsel have any standing whatever in 
the present case. They were both our representatives 
and ther·e is no adversary except defendant in her per-
s·onal capacity seeking to avoid the results of the mis-
representation ·of us in the ~probate proceedings. It is 
merely begging the question to say that Judge Hend-
ricks would have done the same as he did had he known 
all the facts. The presump·tion is that a court wiU do 
what is right, and it was the duty of the court had all 
the facts heen disclosed to see that Austin Rice received 
the land he occupied with the appurtenant water. De-
fendant again urges that we were negligent and, there-
fore, she can reap the fruits of her wrongdoing. We 
have already sufficiently answered that. The authori-
ties are uniform that we were not under any duty to 
scrutinize her acts or conduct, but were entitled to rely 
implicitely upon her to re:present us properly. 
She alleges ·that if there was any failure to disc~ose 
facts, that was intrinsic fraud. Under the doctrine of 
the Weyant and all the other cases that is extrinsic fraud, 
but regardless of whether it is called extrinsic or intrin-
sic recovery is allowed because of the fiduciary relation-
ship. Defendant asserts that Judge Cowley declined to 
agree with our contention. This is not accurate. Judge 
Cowley did agree, contrary to defendant's vehement and 
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continued protests, that she had attempted to deprive us 
of appurtenant \Yater. That is the main point in the 
case. The farm \vithout the water is no good as a farm. 
He did not agree that \Ye occupied the barn and corral 
property, but in this he is mistaken because the evidence 
is without dispute that \ve al\vays occupied it and that 
it was an essential part of the farm. Being entitled as 
we were to the barn and corral ·property and to the ap-
purtenant w ..ater, defendant's attempt to depTive us of 
it and her failure to disclose the facts to the probate 
court constituted extrinsic fraud, hut call it what you 
may it \vas such fraud as can be rectified under all th·e 
authorities. Defendant says she honestly presented her 
petition for distri'bution on the basis of her understand-
ing, and that she acted in entire good faith. If so, why 
did she describe in her petition for distribution ap-
purtenant water in describing all of the tracts that went 
to her and leav.e out the appurtenant water in Austin's ~ 
Why was Austin's the only tract which showed appurten-
ant water according to the inventories where the ap-
purtenant water was omitted in the rpetition for distri-
bution~ We can only judge her honesty and good faith 
by what she did and by her continued and present effort 
to keep Austin from acquiring the appurtenant water and 
all the land he occupied. 
At page 19 of her brief defendant says we have dis-
regarded the theory of our case and entire~y ignored the 
only charge of fraud stated in our complaint, and that 
we undertake now to base our case on intrinsic fraud. 
The stat·ement is entirely inaccurate, as we have already 
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shown. Our theory is now as it always has been. Then 
on pages 20, ·21 and 22 defendant adverts to the cases 
cited by us in our former hrief to show that in each case 
the fraud involved was intrinsic. Defendant overlooks 
the faet that whether the fraud was intrinsic or extrinsic 
the court granted relief from the judgrnent obtained by 
such fraud. If the defendant insists on calling the 
fraud in thos·e cases intrinsic, which the -courts involved 
didn't so label, then she, of cours-e, is obliged to con0ede 
that all those cases, because of the fiduciary relation-
ship, a~lowed recovery where the fraud was intrinsic. As 
a rna tter of fact, some of the cases call the· fraud ·ex-
trinsic and some of them don't attempt to label it at all. 
Extrinsic fraud doesn't consist merely in failing to- give 
notice to heirs, hut extrinsic fraud involves any conduct 
of the fiduciary which results in loss to the beneficiary, 
particularly where the fiduciary benefits. It also oc-
curs. where the fiduciary fails to disclose the facts or 
advances erroneous facts as the hasis for the judgm·ent. 
Defendant asserts that a~l the cases cited hy us show 
deliberate bad faith and intentional fraud. The de-
fendant's conduct in the present case was intentional 
and deliberate and still is. 
The case of U. 8. vs. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 
65, 25 L. Ed. 93, is cited by defendant. It was also cited 
by us in our former brief and by this court in its decision 
heriein in the former case. While that case involved an 
adversary proceeding, it is authority for the pro:position 
that where one is p·revented from ·exhibiting fully his case 
by fraud or deception so that there has never been a real 
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contest the fraud is extrinsic. No one can contend that 
plaintiff ever had a hearing until this present hearing, 
and he didn't have a hearing, either because defendant 
said she would protect him, or because she told him 
he was not ieft the property that actually was left to 
him under the will, and he relied upon her statements as 
he had a right to do. 
Defendant contends that the decree of distribution 
is conclusive construction of the will and cites at pages 
26 and 27 two California cases, Go·olde vs. Montgomery, 
·51 Pac. 682, and In re Keet's Estate, 91 Pac. (2) 944. 
Defendant also cited these cases on the former appeal in 
this case. These cases do not sup·port the defendant in 
any position involved in this matter. No question of 
fraud arose in those cases. However, the court in the 
Keet case did say that in spite of a statute p-roviding that 
.the administration of a trust must follow the decree of 
distribution circumstances could arise that would justify 
the court in departing from provisions of the decree of 
distribution. The court points out that there is no such 
sanctity to a decree of distribution as to make it com-
pletely unallterable. What the court held was that there 
had not been presented to the court any facts justifying 
a change in the terms of the decree of distribution. 
The obvious inference is that had there heen such facts 
presented a change in the decree of distribution would 
have been sustained. In the case at bar we are not 
seeking to abrogate 1:he decr;ee of distribution but only to 
correct it so that it will speak truly concerning the de-
vise made by the testator. ·The case merely holds that 
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the court sitting in probate has no power under the facts 
presented to terminate a trust before the time designated 
for its termination by the decree of distribution. ·The 
Goode case merely holds that the terms of a will can-
not be used as evidence to impeach the decree of dis-
tribution. No question of fraud arose or was con-
sidered in that case, nor was th·ere any fiduciary in-
volved. 
On :page 31 of her brief defendant argues that if 
David L. Rice did originally acquire any water right 
with the decreed ~and, he transferred that to his lands 
to the north and abandoned its use on the Austin Rice 
tract. David L. Rice didn't so state in his application 
to the State Engineer, nor ·did the trial cour:t so find, 
nor does the evidence so show. Defendant's entire brief 
is a peculiar plea of confession and avoidance. In one 
breath she asserts she has done no wrong, and in the 
next breath that even if she has she should not be cor-
rected. Not because of any rights of innocent third 
persons, but because we didn't distrust her in time to 
appeal from the decree of distribution. There is no 
law whatever to support any such proposition. 
We submit that the trial court having found an ap-
purtenant water right was bound to accept the only evi-
dence ther;e is as to the extent of tha;t right. Having 
found an ap:purtenant water right, the only evidence 
there is as to what amount of water is necessary to 
mature the crops and what amount of water was used, 
is that the spring or high water whenever required and 
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available, and the water after it had gone on turns to 
the extent of ten hours a week, was necessary on this 
land and had been used thereon. There is no dispute 
whatever in the record that Austin occupied the barn 
and corral property. The decree of the trial court should 
be corrected to give the p~aintiff the water prop·erly ap-
purtenant to this land as abov.e indicated and the barn 
and the corral property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES 
Attorney f.orr Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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